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This paper focuses on two companies where the risk management staff had successfully defined and brought about their version of risk management. Having traced the evolution of these two riskmanagement functions, their apparatus (tools and processes), and their relationship with the rest of the organization, I was struck, first, by the apparent success of these CROs at making risk management a seemingly inevitable, inconspicuous part of organizational life. Over the years, they developed new tools that seamlessly linked up with the work of business managers, creating the impression that the real work of risk management took place in the business lines, and was carried out by employees. Yet the risk managers (or rather, the risk-function managers) retained a certain amount of attachment to these practices that enabled them to demarcate risk management as their expertise and raison d'etre.
Secondly, I was also intrigued by the paradoxical attitudes displayed by these CROs towards their own work: they appeared to be tremendously confident and surprisingly humble. The CROs were surrounded by corporate governance advocates, regulators, consultants and certified risk professionals with a vested interest in telling them what risk managers should do and be. But they had the confidence to steer away from the emerging conventional wisdom, the risk-management standards and guidelines, and the "charlatans" who advocated them. They took on the challenge to develop the idea of risk management and its apparatus themselves. Yet at the same time, they displayed a lot of humility, acknowledging failures, struggles and imperfections. They regarded their work unfinished.
Thirdly, these CROs sensed that the excessive use of certain kinds of risk-management vocabulary, technology, and their uncritical adaption could harm, rather than further their cause. Irritated by the proliferation of abstract vocabulary emanating from risk-management standards, these CROs tried to learn and speak the language of the business. By co-creating risk tools and a sparse risk vocabulary with those who were to use them, these CROs brought about inconspicuous risk talk -managers were not even conscious of speaking a new language, that of risk management.
Finally, these CROs operated extremely frugally -with one or two full-time staff, they played the role of the facilitator of risk talk, and kept their resource requirements to a bare minimum. They planned no further "investment in risk management", and did not ask for increases in their formal authority or decision rights. Towards the end of the research horizon, at both companies the role of the CRO was structurally demoted (one or two steps further removed from the CEO in the reporting hierarchy), yet their organizational reach and influence remained unchanged. Thus, the two case studies document what might be called the triumph of the humble CRO over the advocates of ever-more visible, better-resourced and highly independent risk managers. It is the triumph of ordinary risk talk and an unobtrusive risk apparatus over ever-more sophisticated risk models and offthe-shelf IT programs that promise a comprehensive and elaborate display of risks. The following sections aim to describe the movements of this evolution, as evidenced by the case studies. I start with a brief description of the case sites and the research process. Second, I outline the evolution of the risk apparatus and describe the work of risk management ("riskwork") at the two companies. Third, I describe their efforts at facilitating inconspicuous risk talk and unobtrusive risk tools. Next, I illustrate the mix of confidence and humility that characterized the attitude of these CROs towards their own creations. Here I shall also describe how these CROs kept their span of control (Simons, 2005) narrow, and even came to accept less formal authority, while (somewhat counterintuitively) they succeeded at widening their span of support 4 .
The case sites and research process Electroworks, a major Canadian power utility, operated in an industry in which lack of reliability could lead not only to financial and asset damage but also to human injury and death. The provincial regulatory agency had capped the price that Electroworks could charge, while also requiring it to lead conservation initiatives that would reduce future revenues and earnings. Electroworks had to manage a complex web of conflicting interests-the agendas of government ministers, regulators, consumers, environmental groups, aboriginal ("first nation") landowners, and the capital-market debt-holders that had subscribed to the company's C$1 billion bond issue. I started field work at Electroworks in spring 2008. Through 25 interviews (see Appendix 1 for a list of interviews), I aimed to reconstruct the history of ERM from its original consultant-led introduction through its transformation to its current inevitable, yet still unfinished and evolving state.
Magic Toys was a large, family-owned toymaker, operating within a highly competitive, fast-paced industry, which essentially produces and markets "fashion for kids". The majority of the company's annual sales came from new product launches, which elevated the importance of product development and innovation. The firm's primary customers were the global retailers who distributed children's toys. Serving these retail chains with accurate and timely deliveries, and ensuring their fast shelf-turnover were of paramount importance in Magic Toys' business model, which aspired to possess "world-class" marketing and distribution capabilities. In this context, risk management's role was to assist the smooth delivery of new product lines (each carried out as a separate project) and to "prepare the company for uncertainty". I started field work at Magic Toys in 2010, and through 44 interviews (see Appendix 2 for a list of interviews) with risk-function managers and business executives, I tried to sketch the evolution of risk practices from "form-filling" to an established, actionable and consequential part of the annual planning exercise.
The evolution of the risk-management apparatus

Origins
Early 1999, in preparation for listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange, the board of directors at Electroworks decided that the company should implement enterprise risk management (ERM), in compliance with listing requirements 5 . They hired a succession of four consulting firms who (in the words of the later chief risk officer) "all came through doing ERM-type stuff. They would come in. They would do risk interviews. They would do risk maps. They would charge a quarter of a million dollars, and deliver a nice report. But nothing happened; there was no knowledge transfer." After this perceived false start, the CEO and 5 CFO asked the head of internal audit, Robert Lewis 6 "to take on ERM" with very little directive, out of a sense of need conveyed by the board and the listing requirements. Originally hired from the banking industry to be the head of internal audit, Lewis had little expertise in any of the day-to-day challenges faced by Electroworks' line-workers, engineers, lawyers and customer service managers. Trained as an accountant and experienced as an internal auditor, Lewis saw risk management both as a challenge and a development opportunity for his control function. He realized that he could make this function his own, and have a wide span of control over defining what risk management was to be: Lewis established a "Chinese wall" to separate his internal audit role from his risk management one. Records of the risk workshops were kept confidential and separate from internal audit assessments and no one, besides himself, was involved in both activities. He had the habit of signaling which hat he was wearing by actually appearing in meetings with a baseball cap carrying either the Internal Audit or the ERM label. **** In contrast to Lewis, Carl Hirschman, 7 Magic Toys' CRO, spent his entire career in the company, as a financial controller. The notion of risk management came to him as an out-of-the-blue request from his boss, the CFO in 2007. At the time, Magic Toys was recovering from a serious crisis that saw high staff turnover and the appointment of the company's first ever "outside" CEO (a former McKinsey consultant). As part of the recovery, the board requested that the company should adopt "riskmanagement best practices". Similarly to Lewis, Hirschamn initially refused to take on the role, but then ended up defining it for himself: [Initially,] I said, "No, because that's a compliance job, and I don't Initially, "riskwork" at Electroworks was manifest in the proliferation of risk-management workshops in which participants evaluated "risk impact", "probability of risk occurrence" and "control strength" (in order to get a sense of "residual risk"). The workshops achieved a consensus assessment on each of these dimensions by repeated and anonymous voting, with intermittent discussions, facilitated by a risk officer ("Workshop Facilitator"). Once the management team had assessed risks and controls, the risk officers prepared a risk map-a two-dimensional rank-ordered chart of "residual risks." To prepare for the final phase of the ERM process (risk-based resource allocation), the investment planning department and the risk management team jointly developed templates for allocating resources.
Engineers (challenged by the investment planning department) had to evaluate their proposals in terms of cost and the severity of the risk that their program aimed to mitigate. They calculated a "bang for the buck" index to show the risk reduction per dollar spent, and ranked the investment programs accordingly. By 2004, the engineering teams and top management were both sufficiently "fluent" in risk and cost assessments that they were able to do without the investment-management department. The investment management department was dissolved -yet the risk management team, and the practice of risk-based resource allocation, remained.
In 2008, responding the global financial crisis and a world-wide concern with systemic risks and "black swan" events 8 , Lewis and his team initiated so-called "black swan workshops," a separate process to focus executives' and board members' attention on low-probability high-impact events that did not normally come up during risk workshops and the bi-annual risk updates. These discussions used a new template, asking directors to consider the "velocity of the underlying trend" and the company's perceived "resilience" to such events. Lewis described these workshops as "more a thought experiment than a risk workshop." The "black swan workshops" were held on demand (but at least annually). Insights from the "black swan workshops" were fed back into the company's disaster recovery plans. *****
The following timeline summarizes the evolution of the risk-management processes and apparatus at Magic Toys. Spreadsheet tool for risk and opportunity identification; Bi-annual ERM Report; Scenarios (internally generated)
2006-
8
Noting that Magic Beans was a project-focussed organization (with each project leading to a new product release or a process improvement), Hirschman defined risk at the level of projects, as "a change, which negatively impacts our ability to achieve our targets and goals with the strategies and initiatives defined 9 " and gave managers a list of examples ("loss of consumer affinity; loss of major customer; changes in the competitive landscape; loss of integrity; major supply chain disruptions").
Hirschman's first deliverable to the Magic Toys board was a 15-page report on the strategic risks (including a two-page "bullet list and a single chart"), as assessed by the business lines. The report was based on a spreadsheet that Hirschman developed for the interrogation and collection of strategic risk information.
The board reports got updated bi-annually. In between, Hirschman and his team introduced scenario planning in an effort to help managers "prepare for uncertainty", but also, for the periodic reassessments of the 110 risks they collectively logged in the risk spreadsheet. After an initial fiasco, the scenario exercise was redesigned for higher relevance, spread -and by 2012, became an integral part of Magic Toys' planning process.
Inconspicuous risk talk and unobtrusive risk tools
Lewis acknowledged that the risk assessment process at Electroworks was subjective, not "scientific."
Yet the risk workshops were an instant and enduring success, as explained by one risk officer (the Workshop Facilitator"):
Our original ambitious plan was to do twelve risk assessments a year. The senior executive team embraced the approach so enthusiastically that one year we did 60 different risk assessment workshops. My role was to help executives tell their bosses about the risks they faced and how they were mitigating those risks. We helped them make judgments about the adequacy of the mitigating actions proposed and taken.
In order to make the risk assessment-discussions relevant, the risk team realized that their tools (riskassessment templates) had to be perceived as relevant too. They asked senior managers, who had accountability for the particular risk areas (financial, regulatory etc.), to review and approve the impact scales annually. Thus the CFO defined and reviewed the financial scale, the chief regulatory officer reviewed the regulatory scale, and so on. In the end, the impact scale represented every business functions' concern, in parallel to others' -resembling to a multi-language manual that everyone concerned could read (see Appendix 3). Lewis described how business managers used the template: Having co-created the language of risk assessments with the business lines, Lewis also co-opted business managers in setting the agenda for the risk workshops. Prior to each risk workshop, Lewis' risk team informally polled participants and drew up a generic list of 60-70 potential risks or threats to the business or the project being discussed. They e-mailed the list to the participating management team asking them to choose the ten most critical risks facing their business or project. Based on these choices the risk team narrowed the list to 8-10 risks. A risk officer then started the half-day risk assessment workshop with the presentation of the shortlisted risks, and asked participants to confirm whether these were in fact the most important risks or whether any others should be discussed in detail instead.
In order to prepare the bi-annual risk updates, Lewis did a series of interviews with the top 30 to 40 executives and consulted other sources, such as annual business plans and risk workshops. But generally, these discussions were driven by managerial concerns, which Lewis merely directed into reporting templates: Having learnt from the experience, Hirschman redesigned the scenario process to allow managers to generate scenarios based on their own worries, with the risk team providing mere suggestions for the 10 Pseudonym "dimensions of uncertainty" that managers can pick from and freely add to. Secondly, he initiated scenario discussions to explicitly "support" business managers with the preparation of their annual plans. In the scenario sessions managers listed issues they had to contend under each scenario, and then prioritized them (based on their likelihood and the speed of their emergence). The sessions never concluded without an hour-long discussion of "Act" issues -managers had to agree explicitly "who is doing what by when" about the fast-emerging, most likely issues.
Hirschman considered the introduction of the "fifth hour" (and the inclusion of the "Act-issues" in the annual business plans) as the turning point: "And that was it. That final discussion makes sure that the "Act-
issues" are actually acted upon. It was a hint given to us from two members of our [top management]. Then it just became part of the business planning process."
Scenario planning became part of Magic Toys' business-planning process at in 2013. With the involvement of 19 top managers and over 200 other employees, 23 scenario sessions were held, affecting 21 three-year business plans. The heads of three business areas chose to deploy scenario planning upfront, as an "inspiration" to their regular planning process, while the others deployed these sessions ex post, as a way of "resilience testing". Hirschman reported the scenario planning sessions helped the managers collectively identify 136 "Act issues" and 80 "Prepare issues," which subsequently resulted in adjustments to the "Must-Win Battles" and "How to Win" sections of the 21 business plans.
Confidence
With no formal qualifications or domain expertise to engage Electroworks' engineers at risk assessment workshops and at resource allocation meetings, Lewis and his team acted as a facilitator. But they did their homework in response to the board's request for an ERM process -they spent four months "reading everything we could about it: publications by the Conference Board of Canada, by Tillinghast Towers Perrin, the Australian Standard 4360 11 , articles and many books." In the end, Lewis concluded "to do it [his] own way":
There has been a lot of bad literature, a lot of bad consultants; a lot of people were going down the wrong road. [ERM consultants] would charge us [a fortune] to do something they probably did the week before for some other company. In the end, I concluded ERM can be so simple and so logical -was it not for the many people who seek to complicate it.
Lewis' espoused practice of ERM required three people ("three personality types"):
The first one is someone to make it happen. That's me. Okay, somebody who will push down doors, is driven, and has the credibility and authority to open doors and make it happen. The second is a nice charismatic personality who people enjoy working with. And that was [the Workshop Facilitator] -an absolute charmer. A super nice guy, goodlooking, charming, very knowledgeable, who became a very good [workshop] facilitator. The third one is a person with an analytical mind who can manage the vast quantities of data [collected at the workshops]. You don't find those characteristics in the same person -so I teamed them together.
He consciously departed from conventional wisdom by deciding to "just start running workshops":
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The theory says go on, train and educate people on ERM by going and giving presentations. My answer to this was "No, no, no, you have to run workshops; that's the way you get others involved, engaged, and that's how they learn, not by sitting through a Power Point.
By 2003, ERM at Electroworks was sufficiently established so that Lewis could judge it as a success and confidently entered the wider ERM discourse by publishing articles and book chapters on Electroworks' ERM practice. Publcizing his approach to ERM was part of his campaign against "people who seek to complicate" ERM, but it also reassured the company's management team and board of directors that "we were ahead of the game and our regulator was so impressed with [our ERM] that they are going to take and mandate it for everyone else to do it this way [in the industry]. **** Having examined several software packages and attended consultants' presentations on risk databases, Hirschman concluded that "finding the right one [for Magic Toys] was rather difficult". He ended up developing his own Excel spreadsheet ("I've used Excel since 1984, I know how to do it"), which was maintained and updated by one of his team members, based on written or spoken input from "risk owners".
Hirschman continuously wheedled and cajoled business managers to send updates on risks and actions. He never used fiat and never referenced the ERM policy documents -he appeared permissive, and lenient but at the same time, the downside consequences of not responding was implicit in these communications. He described one instance when a late response cost a manager holiday time to catch up with his risk reporting: Hirschman made it clear to everyone that his responsibility concerned the design and facilitation of the SRM process -not more, not less. He pushed back on a request for quarterly risk reports from a board member arguing that "ours is a seasonal business -we have half the turnover the last ten weeks of Christmas; the majority of the rest around Easter. It doesn't make sense to make a first and third quarter report." When the board member insisted on the quarterly reporting, Hirschman stood his ground and persuaded the CEO that it would be "a waste of time". The director yielded.
Having facilitated the preparation of the bi-annual risk report, the risk team did not remain entirely silent. In the report, there was a separate section devoted to "what the Strategic Risk Management Office believes." Here Hirschman could be explicit and challenging: "In the latest report I just sent out in June, I put in the comments that this year may be the first one since 2005 that we will not meet our targets. I had the CFO on the phone as soon as he saw the draft, telling me: 'Our target is 11% sales growth. That number is not in jeopardy. ' And I said, 'Sorry, John, I don't Over the years, Hirschman formulated a view of risk management that put emphasis on its enabling, rather than constraining aspect, and he put it in writing in a series of papers and book chapters coauthored by a business-school academic. Contradicting the corporate governance advocates and guidelines that considered risk management as a "line of defense" in the internal control landscape, Hirschman emphasized that the role of the risk management function was to support, rather than control managers:
I think one of the places where the traditional risk managers in other companies have problems is that they emerged -they come from a control environment, internal audit or something like that. That means that when they walk in the door, you see them as internal audit coming and checking you up. We do not come from that part of the business. We've never been into that -actually until a couple of years ago, we never had an internal audit function. But, we're coming with a license to ask questions that help them succeed. Because, well -SRM may be a part of controlling, but it's actually a part of supporting.
Humility and frugality
While the risk team remained small, as per Lewis' original vision (one person providing authority; a Workshop Facilitator and a Data Manager), its reach impacted much of the organization though workshops, the annual planning and the bi-annual updates. Lewis and team were quick to acknowledge that despite their perceived successes, their full vision for ERM was never accomplished, and perhaps will never be. Lewis summarized his "theoretical dream" as the "risk dashboard" -a software-enabled, computerized version of his risk reports, accessible anytime by any senior manager, providing up-to-date and fast graphic displays of all risk information, summarized into colourful risk maps and Top 10 risk lists, with drill-down capability into individual items. But Lewis was conscious that Electroworks did not have the "systems", skill set or "culture" to implement such a model. At Electroworks, the risk function's span of control (in terms of resources, decision rights and formal authority) remained narrow, and even narrowed over time. However, the willingness of the CEO and the business lines to participate in risk talk, made up for that frugality. Bringing about that wide span of support via the proliferation of an unobtrusive, business-relevant risk process and vocabulary, was the risk team's key achievement. **** At Magic Toys, Hirschman faced a number of debacles as he built his own risk-management tools and processes. He noted that "the first couple of databases didn't work, the third one did." This trial-and-error approach characterized the development of the scenario process too. After the initial disappointment, Hirschman was ready to admit to senior managers that the exercise failed due to the lack of any "followthrough or action." Despite this acknowledgement, one of the senior managers expressed support and that became the catalyst for the further development of the tool:
In early 2011, I got to talk by coincidence with [senior manager] over a cup of coffee, and we got to talk about these scenarios and he said, 'You really have something good about this scenario discussion, quite great. Why didn't work?' I said, 'I really don't know. I understood it didn't work and I accept that it didn't work, but I really don't know why.' He said, 'Try to figure it out. See if we can make it work.' And I went back with that and said to myself over and over, 'okay, why didn't it work?', and contemplated why it didn't work and eventually, I found out where the flaws was: the ownership of the scenarios.
Hirschman and his team insisted that in the risk discussions, whatever tool was used to channel them, managers had to "keep their thunder". Despite its humble rhetoric of simplicity, common sense, Hirschman created a risk function that had the ears of the board and senior management. This remained the case even when a management reorganization left the CRO with a reporting line to the Treasurer (who then reported to the CFO). Though formally the CRO was "4 steps removed" from the board of directors, by 2013 he established a process that shaped the discussion of every business plan, and the biannual board meetings.
Hirschman commented that despite his seemingly frugal resources (and small team of two) he enjoyed a wide span of support. By mentoring the young owner, Hirschman's role acquired another layer of significance. He was becoming influential in the manner of the famous Grey Eminences of a by-gone era -operating "behind the scenes" in an unofficial capacity of their own making.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper tracked the evolution of the role of two chief risk officers (CROs), and the tools and processes they have implemented in their respective organizations. While the companies are from very different industries (one is a power company, the other is a toy manufacturer), they both embraced the concepts and tools of Enterprise Risk Management. Over a number of years, at both firms, risk management transformed from a collection of "off-the-shelf", acquired tools and practices into a seemingly inevitable and tailored control process. The paper investigated the role of the CRO in making these transformations happen.
The CRO at Electroworks, by the facilitation of continuous risk talk in workshops and face-to-face meetings, over ten years, has succeeded in orchestrating the creation and proliferation of a new language (that of risk management), and established processes that regularly brought business people together from diverse places and hierarchical levels, to discuss issues of concern. Far from being self-evident, risk talk, manifest in, for example, 1-5 assessments of "impact and likelihood of risk", and formally documented in risk maps and "lists of top 10 risks", took a long time to proliferate. The contribution of the CRO (and his small team) was to co-opt the business in the creation and use of risk talk. By merely providing a few rudimentary concepts and a minimal risk vocabulary, the CRO was able to get business people to fill in troubling gaps in meaning, and to add the rules of use, by for example delegating the definition of "1-5 impact scales" to those able to make sense, and also to make use, of them. The final test of the acceptance of risk talk was its formal linking to resource allocation in the annual budgeting process, which gave risk management permanence, significance and a sense of inevitability.
The second case, in a seeming contrast, focused on a CRO, who initially tried and failed to create linkages of permanence and significance between some conventional ERM tools (similar to those championed by his counterpart above) and the business lines. After a period of search, the CRO settled on a less conventional risk-identification tool, scenario planning, and facilitated its transformation, over five years from an ad hoc future-gauging exercise to widely accepted risk talk -and a seemingly selfevident element of the annual business planning process.
The two cases highlight that the role of the CRO may be less about the packaging and marketing of risk management tools to business managers, but instead, the facilitation of the creation and internalization of a specific type of risk talk as a legitimate, cross-functional language of business. The risk-management function may be most successful when it resists conventional and conflicting demands to be either close to, or independent from, business managers. Instead, by acting as a facilitator of risk talk the CRO can enable the real work of risk management to take place not in his own function, but in the business lines. In both cases, facilitation involved a significant degree of humility on the part of the CRO, manifest in limited (and paradoxically decreasing) formal authority and meagre resources. Their skill was to build an informal network of relationships with executives and business managers, which allowed them to resist being stereotyped as either compliance champions or business partners. Instead they created and shaped the perception of their role which was of their own making: a careful balancing act between keeping one's distance and staying involved. This analysis suggests that calls for increasing investments in risk management, and for the formal inclusion of senior risk officers in the C-suite might be misguided. In order to close the expectations gap, risk managers need first and foremost commitment from others in the organization to accept a relevant and situationally contingent version of risk management, tailored to their needs. Thus the sign of success of the humble CRO is not so much in her ability to go "beyond the compliance role" or turn into a "business partner", but in her ability to bring about consequential risk talk where it matters, in the business lines, helping those who carry out the real work of risk management -managing risks.
